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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

State Department review completed

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LEBANON-ISRAEL: The Israeli air strikes last Sunday have complicated Lebanon's already difficult task of enforcing its restrictions on the fedayeen. The Israelis, however, evidently intend to press on with a campaign of pre-emptive attacks.

The Lebanese Government believes that the latest bombing attacks have undercut its rationale for imposing curbs on guerrilla activities in southern Lebanon. Since Israel's attacks on fedayeen bases in Lebanon last month, the government has forced the commandos from a large area of the south and curtailed guerrilla raids into Israel in order to deny the Israelis a pretext for retaliating against Lebanese territory.

Critics of the policy of reining in the guerrillas are certain to point to the absence of any clear fedayeen provocation. Those groups in Lebanon that are sympathetic to the guerrillas will argue that Israel will implement its post-Munich policy of "continuous war" against the fedayeen whether or not the commandos launch raids into Israel. As a result, the army's role of policing the fedayeen will probably come under increasingly heavy criticism.

Repercussions from the raids are likely to affect the fedayeen movement itself. The fedayeen leadership has had difficulty in holding support for the suspension of forays into Israel. Extremist dissenters are now almost certain to argue that the political climate is right for a resumption of crossborder operations.

Some Israeli military officials believe that the Lebanese Army, if it chose, could eradicate the fedayeen movement in Lebanon, much as King Husayn did in Jordan. The timing of the strikes also may have been designed for political impact in Israel; they took place the day before Mrs. Meir's speech yesterday at the re-opening of the Knesset. She reiterated that Israel's war against the Arab terrorists could not be limited to a defensive one, but must also be aimed at "stamping out" the terrorist organizations.

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CHILE: Although the opposition's effort to throttle economic activity is gaining new support, the Allende government's responses so far have offset the immediate effects of the strikes.

| Both the Christian Democratic and Nationaties have announced support of the strikes and | l some |
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| of their partisans are joining the stoppages.   |        |
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Many stores in downtown Santiago opened for business yesterday in response to police pressure and threats of requisitioning by the government. Small opposition groups were quickly dispersed by the expedient use of tear gas, and police units were ordered to patrol in force to protect shopowners and workers who defied the strike. After a day's return to normal broadcasting, all radio stations have again been required to carry only official programs. Using military protection, the government has taken almost complete charge of transportation and the distribution of food and fuel, both in short supply. The dynamiting of a railway line from the principal port serving Santiago triggered a further step-up of security measures for vital installations.

The growing bitterness on both sides may make the accustomed search for a negotiated solution more difficult and accelerate the economic deterioration that is President Allende's most serious problem.

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LAOS: Communist and government forces in north Laos are regrouping following last week's heavy fighting on the southern Plaine des Jarres.

Vang Pao's irregulars are attempting to consolidate their positions in the hills just south of the Plaine des Jarres. These troops have sighted tanks nearby but thus far they have only been hit by several small-scale ground attacks.

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In south Laos, where military activity has been at a low level since government troops recaptured Khong Sedone in early summer, the North Vietnamese appear to be preparing for increased combat. US pilots \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ report signs of an enemy build-up east and southeast of Khong Sedone.

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Communist units in the past week have strongly resisted Lao Army efforts to recapture villages east of Khong Sedone. Late yesterday three government companies operating in the area came under heavy enemy attack, and were forced to withdraw to Khong Sedone. The North Vietnamese may be preparing to attack Khong Sedone in an effort to forestall any government attempt to push east into the Se Done Valley or onto the Bolovens Plateau.

On the political front, the opening round of peace talks in Vientiane will begin today. Government sources had earlier stated that the first session would be held on 16 October, but the Communists spent the day making courtesy calls.

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